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Abstract 
The United States has invested large sums of resources in multiple conservation pro-
grams for agriculture over the past century. In this paper we focus on the impacts of pro-
gram interactions. Specifically, using an integrated economic and bio-physical modeling 
framework, we consider the impacts of the presence of working land programs on a land 
retirement for an important agricultural region—the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
(UMRB). Compared to a land retirement only program, we find that the presence of a 
working land program for conservation tillage results in significantly lower predicted 
signups for land retirement at a given rental rate. We also find that the presence of both a 
large working land and land retirement program can result in more environmental bene-
fits and income transfers than a land retirement only program can achieve. 
 
Keywords: Conservation Reserve Program, conservation tillage, environmental quality, 
income transfer, working land programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
THE CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM IN THE PRESENCE OF A 
WORKING LAND ALTERNATIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, PROGRAM PARTICIPATION,  
AND INCOME TRANSFER 
The United States has invested a large amount of resources in conservation programs 
for agriculture over the past century. Beginning in 1985, the largest and most ambitious 
conservation program, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), was introduced with 
dual goals of controlling supply and reducing soil erosion. As reported in Claassen et al. 
2001, over $15 billion dollars was spent in the first 15 years, which resulted in the retire-
ment of about 10 percent of total cropland across the country from active production.   
The CRP provides payments to farmers to retire environmentally sensitive land from 
active crop production and establish environmentally beneficial cover for the length of a 
contract, typically 10 to 15 years. Although the CRP has evolved to target a broad array 
of environmental benefits, it operates strictly through land retirement. For land remaining 
in production, so-called working land, other programs have been instituted, such as the 
Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) and the newly initiated Conservation 
Security Program (CSP), both of which encourage the adoption/maintenance of conserva-
tion practices on working land.  
A number of important investigations of the CRP have been undertaken and much 
insight concerning the efficiency and shortcomings of the program has been gained.1 
However, one issue that has not received much attention is the consequences of working 
land programs that compete for the same parcels of land. This question is particularly 
relevant in light of the CSP, which, for the first time, makes direct payments for the adop-
tion of conservation practices on working land that explicitly cover their full opportunity 
cost. Previous programs, notably EQIP, pay only a share of the total cost of a practice and 
thus less directly compete with the CRP for participants. The design and magnitude of 
both the CRP and the CSP appear to be central topics on the agenda of environmental 
discussions related to the 2007 farm bill. Thus, it will be increasingly important to under-
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stand the potential complementarities and conflicts between these two programs. In this 
paper, we consider the consequences of a working land program for the performance of a 
land retirement program measured in terms of cost, program enrollment, environmental 
effectiveness, and income transfer. 
Faced simultaneously with programs for land retirement and conservation practices 
on working land, farmers must decide whether to retire a piece of land and enroll it in 
CRP, to cultivate the land with conservation practices and receive a payment, or not to 
participate in either program. Their decision will affect the efficacy of each individual 
program. While the literature indicates that targeting conservation payments can result in 
more effective use of conservation budgets, targeting in the presence of multiple conser-
vation programs has not been given adequate attention. Yet it is important to understand 
the interaction of programs in order to assess properly the effectiveness of the existing 
portfolio of programs.  
In this paper, we estimate how the existence of conservation programs similar to 
EQIP and CSP might affect the CRP in terms of land enrolled, income transfers to farm-
ers, and the extent of environmental improvement, as measured by agricultural soil car-
bon sequestration, reduction in soil erosion, and reduction in nitrogen runoff. We show 
that, compared to the case where land retirement is the only option, the economic and en-
vironmental results of a land retirement program are very different when working land 
programs are also available. For example, we show that the same unit payments for land 
retirement in the presence of subsidies for conservation tillage can enroll only about half 
of the acreage that can be enrolled in the absence of such subsidies.  
We consider these program interactions for a critically important agricultural region 
of the country—the Upper Mississippi River Basin (UMRB), with an area of 189,000 
square miles. The map on the left in Figure 1 shows the location of the UMRB in the 
United States and the Mississippi River Basin (the dark shaded area). The map on the 
right in Figure 1 displays the boundaries of the 14 U.S. Geological Service four-digit sub-
watersheds and the percentage of crop and pasture land in each watershed (the numbers 
in parentheses). The UMRB is dominated by agriculture (NAS 2000): cropland and pas-
ture together account for nearly 67 percent of the total area, with the percentage varying 
significantly by sub-watershed, as shown in Figure 1. The area is estimated to be the  
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FIGURE 1. The Upper Mississippi River Basin: percentage of area under cropland by 
sub-watersheds  
 
source of nearly 40 percent of the Mississippi nitrate load discharged during 1980-1986 
(Goolsby et al. 1999), a prime suspect in the cause of the oxygen-depleted hypoxic zone 
in the Gulf of Mexico, which covered nearly 20,000 square kilometers in 1999 (Rabalais, 
Turner, and Scavia 2002). The UMRB also has lakes with the highest concentrations of 
phosphorous found in the world. 
We turn now to the policies analyzed, followed by a description of the integrated 
economic and biophysical model simulation framework used in the analysis. Then we 
present results and policy implications of the analysis. 
 
Policy Scenarios  
We assess conservation policies that would provide green payments (subsidies) for the 
retirement of land from active production or for the adoption of a major on-farm conserva-
tion practice, conservation tillage.2 We compare and contrast a policy that simultaneously 
offers payments for conservation tillage—a working land practice—with land retirement 
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policies that offer payments solely for land retirement. The purpose of this comparison is to 
determine the effect that a second program that competes for the usage of agricultural land 
for environmental benefits has on the efficacy and cost of the CRP. 
Specifically, we analyze three scenarios. In the first, which we term “CRP with CT,” 
producers are offered a per-acre subsidy to retire land from active production or they can 
choose a subsidy (of different value) to adopt conservation tillage and keep their land in 
active production.3 Given the policy, farmers have three alternatives: produce with con-
ventional tillage, produce with conservation tillage and receive the tillage subsidy, or re-
tire land from production in exchange for the retirement subsidy. We assume that farmers 
will choose between the two subsidies by maximizing the difference between the subsidy 
offered and the producer’s opportunity cost. If neither subsidy exceeds the corresponding 
opportunity cost, the farmer produces with conventional tillage.  
In the remaining two scenarios, the subsidies are only offered for retiring land from 
production. These two scenarios provide a meaningful comparison with the first scenario 
by holding constant either the per-acre payments for land retirement or the total program 
costs. In the scenario “CRP equal payment,” the per-acre payment schedule for land re-
tirement is the same as “CRP with CT,” although no payments are offered for conserva-
tion tillage. However, in the third scenario “CRP equal budget,” the total payments are 
set equal to those in “CRP with CT” in each sub-watershed. The per-acre payments are 
thus determined endogenously so that, for any given sub-watershed, land is retired until 
the same total expenditure is met as under “CRP with CT.” Thus, by construction, the 
first two scenarios have different total program costs but the same per-acre land retire-
ment payments and the first and third have different per-acre payments but the same total 
expenditure. The purpose of the second two scenarios is to compare the efficiency and 
distributional consequences of a single land retirement program with a program that in-
cludes both working land and land retirement opportunities. 
In devising the subsidy levels in these three scenarios, it is most relevant to account 
explicitly for geographic cost variability so we let the per-acre subsidies differ by the sub-
watersheds. This watershed-based geographical approach is consistent with the present 
administration of the CSP. In the first two scenarios, the conservation tillage subsidy is 
set at each sub-watershed’s median of conservation tillage adoption costs (as predicted by 
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our empirical model), and the land retirement subsidy is set at the 10th percentile of land 
retirement costs in the sub-watershed.  
 
Data and Integrated Modeling Framework 
The analysis of the conservation policies is undertaken using an integrated modeling 
framework that combines economic and biophysical models. Our analysis preserves the 
micro-level heterogeneity of individual farmers’ behavior while at the same time allow-
ing consideration of multiple environmental indicators at the sub-watershed and large 
landscape levels.  
Data 
The data come primarily from the 1997 National Resources Inventory (NRI) 
(USDA-NRCS 1997), which provides information on the natural resource characteristics 
of the land, cropping history, conservation practices used by producers, and other data for 
some 37,500 cropland physical points. In the analysis, each NRI point is treated as a pro-
ducer with land homogenous in land use, soil, and other characteristics. The farm size is 
assumed to equal the number of acres represented by the point, which generally ranges 
from a few hundred to several thousand acres in size. Because the data are statistically 
reliable for state and multi-county analysis of non-federal land, they are representative of 
the agricultural land in the UMRB.4 
Costs of Conservation Practices 
To estimate the opportunity cost of conservation tillage adoption, we employ a discrete 
choice model that assumes a producer will adopt conservation tillage when the net returns 
from this farming practice exceed those from conventional tillage plus a risk premium. 
Separate models are fit for each of the sub-watersheds; details on data, model selection, and 
estimation, as well as parameter estimates, are provided in Sengupta, Kurkalova, and Kling 
2005. Since the 1997 NRI does not have information on the use of conservation tillage, the 
econometric models are first estimated using the 1992 NRI and then calibrated to the 1997 
sub-watershed-average conservation tillage adoption rates provided by the Conservation 
Technology Information Center (CTIC 2000), using the procedure described in Feng et al. 
2004. We use the calibrated models to predict 1997 NRI tillage baseline, that is, which 
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points use conservation as opposed to conventional tillage, as well as to estimate point-
specific subsidies needed for the adoption of conservation tillage for the data points that are 
predicted to currently employ conventional tillage. 
Following Smith (1995), we model the opportunity cost of enrollment in CRP via 
cropland cash rental rates. The point-specific cropland cash rental rates for all the NRI 
points in the region are calculated using a set of piece-wise linear functions that relate the 
yield potential to the cash rental rate. Kurkalova, Burkart, and Secchi (2004) describe the 
separate functions estimated for each state and, where possible, for each sub-region.  
Environmental Benefits of Conservation Practices 
Three environmental benefits of conservation tillage adoption and enrollment in 
CRP—soil carbon sequestration, erosion reduction, and nitrogen runoff reduction—are es-
timated at each of the data points using the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate 
(EPIC) model, version 3060 (Izaurralde et al. 2005 and Williams 1990).5 The EPIC model 
simulates crop growth processes and nutrient cycles at a field-scale level for areas homoge-
neous in weather, soil, landscape, crop rotation, and management system parameters.  
To derive the environmental results under conventional tillage for an NRI point, we 
ran EPIC simulations at the point for a 30-year period and then obtained annual averages 
of changes in environmental indicators (e.g., erosion reduction) during the simulation pe-
riod. Similarly, we derived the annual averages of changes in the same environmental 
indicators when the point is under conservation tillage or land retirement with grass 
cover. Then, environmental benefits for conservation tillage were derived as the differ-
ence between the annual averages for conservation and conventional tillage. Likewise, 
environmental benefits for land retirement were derived as the difference between the 
annual averages for land retirement and whichever tillage method is currently used.  
Policy outcomes under the three scenarios were simulated by first utilizing the eco-
nomic models to predict (1) which of the NRI points in the region will enroll in CRP and 
conservation tillage in response to the green payments offered and (2) to estimate the 
costs of the policies together with the income transfer captured by farmers. The predicted 
enrollment in conservation programs was then combined with the EPIC-based estimates 
of carbon sequestration, erosion reduction, and nitrogen runoff reduction to predict the 
environmental improvement attributable to each policy. 
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Results 
Program Participation and Economic Welfare 
Economic outcomes of the scenarios by sub-watersheds and the full study region are 
reported in Tables 1 and 2. In Table 1, the effects of alternative scenarios are compared. 
First, by construction, “CRP equal payment” retires 10 percent of land. However, when 
the land retirement program co-exists with the conservation tillage program (“CRP with 
CT”), the CRP participation drops sharply: only 5 percent of land is now retired. This oc-
curs because half of those fields, where payments for both land retirement and conserva-
tion tillage exceed their respective costs, enroll in conservation tillage because of its 
higher transfer. Interestingly, the effect of the higher transfer is more pronounced in the 
southern sub-watersheds of the UMRB (sub-watersheds 7110 through 7140), where in 
some cases only 2 percent would enroll in CRP if payments for conservation tillage are 
also offered. These findings imply that analyses of CRP that ignore other programs may 
be misleading.  
Second by comparing the “CRP with CT” and “CRP equal budget” scenarios, we see 
that, with the same expenditures, a land-retirement-only program could enroll about 25 
percent of total cropland. While the total acreage of retired land increases from 5 percent 
to 25 percent, the average price for land retirement only increases from $85 to $97 per 
acre. Since the payment is uniform within a watershed (again by construction), it is not 
surprising that the average transfer payment is higher in the “CRP equal budget” scenario 
than in the “CRP with CT” scenario. This is because, as more land is enrolled, the unit 
payment increases and the farmers with lower opportunity cost receive larger transfers.  
In addition, the effects are quite heterogeneous across the watersheds. Because the 
costs of adopting conservation practices vary significantly both across and within the sub-
watersheds, the income transfer on CRP land varies significantly by sub-watershed and 
by scenario. For example, sub-watershed 7030 receives very low transfer per acre, which 
varies from $1.4 per acre under “CRP equal payment” to $2.6 per acre under “CRP equal 
budget.” In contrast, sub-watersheds 7020, 7060, 7080, 7090, and 7100 all get a transfer 
of consistently more than $10 per acre in all three scenarios. The ranking of sub-
watersheds on this measure, however, is not independent of the scenario: the highest 
transfer under “CRP with CT,” almost $17 per acre, is achieved in sub-watershed 7080. 
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However, for the other two scenarios, sub-watersheds 7020 and 7100 are ranked the 
highest, with transfers of $12.1 and $16.8 per acre, respectively. 
Table 2 provides more insight by comparing the results on land retirement and con-
servation tillage when payments are offered for both of them. Not unexpectedly, the pol-
icy is expensive, with the overall cost exceeding $1.1 billion. However, the largest share 
of the program cost, over 70 percent of the total expenditure, is an income transfer, given 
by the sum of producer surpluses retained by the farmers whose opportunity costs fall 
below the subsidies. The average per-acre payment is $29 for adoption of conservation 
tillage and $85 for land retirement. In addition, the average transfer payment from land 
retirement is over $10 per acre less than the transfer payment through conservation till-
age.6 The difference is even more pronounced in terms of the percentage transfer: the 
overall average transfer rates are 15 and 81 percent for land retirement and conservation 
tillage, respectively. 
As shown in the last column of Table 2, there is already a significant proportion of 
current adopters of conservation tillage (i.e., farmers who have already adopted conserva-
tion tillage before the introduction of payments), and thus significantly more acres are 
being paid for the practice. This results from our assumption that current adopters are eli-
gible for payment; relaxing this assumption would reverse the result. Because of this 
higher rate of participation, the total payment of conservation tillage is considerably 
higher than that for land retirement even though the per-acre payment for land retirement 
is almost three times higher. 
Environmental Indicators 
In Table 3, we present the results of the environmental quality changes, including 
carbon sequestration,7 soil erosion reduction, and nutrient runoff for the “CRP with CT” 
and “CRP equal budget” scenarios since these two represent the same total expenditures. 
Two pairs of columns with results are presented for each variable: first the level of the 
variable is reported for the “CRP with CT” scenario, and next to it the percentage of the 
first column’s scenario for the “CRP equal budget” is presented. Thus, the total land area 
affected in “CRP with CT” is about 35 million acres; only about a third of that size is 
   
TA
BL
E 
3.
 
A
re
a
 
a
ffe
ct
ed
 
a
n
d 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l i
m
pr
o
v
em
en
t—
C
R
P 
w
ith
 C
T 
v
er
su
s 
C
R
P 
eq
ua
l b
ud
ge
t 
 
A
re
a 
A
ffe
ct
ed
 
Ca
rb
on
 S
eq
ue
st
er
ed
 
Er
o
sio
n 
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
N
 
R
u
n
of
f R
ed
uc
tio
n 
Su
b-
w
a
te
rs
he
ds
 
CR
P 
w
ith
 
CT
 
(10
00
 a
cr
es
) 
CR
P 
Eq
u
a
l  
 
 
Bu
dg
et
 
(%
) 
CR
P 
w
ith
 
 
CT
 
(10
00
 to
n
s) 
CR
P 
Eq
u
a
l  
 
Bu
dg
et
 
(%
) 
CR
P 
w
ith
 
 
CT
 
(10
00
 to
n
s) 
CR
P 
Eq
u
a
l 
Bu
dg
et
 
(%
) 
CR
P 
w
ith
 
 
CT
 
(10
00
 k
gs
) 
CR
P 
Eq
u
a
l 
Bu
dg
et
 
(%
) 
U
M
RB
 
35
,7
15
 
32
 
15
,2
72
 
36
 
10
1,
71
1 
34
 
36
,9
54
 
43
 
70
10
 
75
5 
39
 
29
9 
15
 
1,
11
4 
26
 
56
2 
40
 
70
20
 
3,
25
3 
41
 
2,
10
2 
50
 
4,
26
2 
34
 
3,
19
4 
43
 
70
30
 
17
2 
40
 
59
 
-
2 
52
4 
29
 
16
9 
50
 
70
40
 
1,
22
4 
33
 
50
2 
5 
3,
50
9 
37
 
1,
01
4 
65
 
70
50
 
28
4 
41
 
12
2 
-
16
 
68
1 
30
 
29
8 
68
 
70
60
 
1,
96
5 
27
 
86
0 
26
 
7,
66
8 
24
 
2,
07
0 
40
 
70
70
 
42
2 
34
 
13
8 
-
4 
95
6 
22
 
36
8 
81
 
70
80
 
8,
59
5 
29
 
4,
18
1 
37
 
29
,4
62
 
32
 
8,
58
2 
34
 
70
90
 
2,
59
2 
30
 
83
4 
32
 
8,
45
5 
28
 
2,
56
7 
36
 
71
00
 
4,
50
7 
31
 
2,
58
1 
41
 
10
,4
62
 
40
 
4,
17
5 
43
 
71
10
 
1,
48
0 
33
 
41
9 
18
 
4,
65
8 
31
 
2,
37
2 
47
 
71
20
 
2,
50
6 
32
 
77
8 
48
 
4,
44
4 
31
 
2,
01
7 
35
 
71
30
 
5,
97
1 
33
 
1,
92
0 
35
 
16
,9
77
 
38
 
6,
17
9 
49
 
71
40
 
1,
99
2 
34
 
47
7 
25
 
8,
53
9 
48
 
3,
38
6 
49
 
No
te
: 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 
fo
r 
“
CR
P 
eq
u
al
 
pa
ym
en
t”
 
ar
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
as
 
a 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f “
CR
P 
w
ith
 
CT
”
 
fo
r 
ea
se
 
o
f c
o
m
pa
ris
o
n
.
 
The Conservation Preserve Program in the Presence of a Working Land Alternative / 11
12 / Feng, Kling, Kurkalova, Secchi, and Gassman 
 
 
affected in the “CRP equal budget” scenario (11 million acres). The difference in size is 
also reflected in the total amount of carbon sequestered and erosion and nitrogen runoff 
reduced. This is consistent with the findings of Feng et al. (2004) who found that for car-
bon sequestration, conservation tillage is significantly more cost-effective than is land 
retirement in Iowa. Note that “CRP with CT” is something of a win-win situation in the 
sense that both the transfer rate and the environmental benefits are higher than in the 
other two scenarios. As with the program participation and economic outcomes, as shown 
in Table 3, the sub-watersheds contribute very differing amounts of environmental bene-
fits to the total and they further differ by scenario among the sub-watersheds. Under 
“CRP equal budget,” sub-watershed 7010 enrolls more than the UMRB-average percent-
age of “CRP with CT” but provides less than the UMRB-average percentages of its envi-
ronmental benefits. The opposite is true for sub-watershed 7100, for which the 
environmental outcomes are still worse than in the “CRP with CT” outcomes but are 
somewhat better than the UMRB-averages. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Working land and land retirement programs are mutually exclusive in the sense that 
a single plot of land can be enrolled in one or the other of these programs but not in both 
simultaneously. This fact means that the programs compete with one another for land, 
and the program choices that landowners make may have significant consequences for 
the performance of each program. The point is not whether it is superior to have a single 
or multiple programs, as both programs appear here to stay and both programs provide 
important benefits. Rather, the point of this research is to underscore the fact that the im-
pact of one program on another is critical at all stages of conservation policy, from their 
design to their implementation to final assessment of their efficacy.  
Indeed, the Conservation Effects Assessment Program of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture is currently assessing the effectiveness of conservation programs such as the 
CRP; without clearly accounting for the interaction with other programs, such assess-
ments could produce inaccurate results or an incomplete picture. Rather than assess each 
program individually, it may be more fruitful to consider whether the bundle of conserva-
tion practices induced by the various portfolios of programs is efficient. 
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Our results suggest that these program interactions may be significant. Specifically, 
the presence of a working land program for conservation tillage that directly competes 
with a land retirement program for enrollment was found in our simulation analysis to 
result in significantly lower predicted sign-ups for land retirement at a given rental rate. 
We also find that the presence of both a large working land program and a land retire-
ment program can result in more environmental benefits and income transfers than land 
retirement can achieve alone. 
  
Endnotes 
1. For a sample of important works in this area, see Osborne 1993; Reichelderfer and 
Boggess 1988; Babcock et al. 1996, 1997; Goodwin and Smith 2003; Feather,  
Hellerstein, and Hansen 1999; and Wu 2000. 
2. While there are many conservation practices that can be implemented on working 
land, conservation tillage is generally viewed as one of the most cost-effective. It is 
therefore a good choice for comparison with land retirement programs that can be 
quite costly. 
3. We assume that farmers receive the tillage subsidy even if they have already imple-
mented conservation tillage practices as a reward for good stewardship. This as-
sumption could easily be relaxed. 
4. Other data used in cost estimation and environmental modeling are further described 
in what follows. 
5. Earlier versions of EPIC were called Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator  
(Williams 1990). 
6. The CT transfer rate can be computed by multiplying the average CT payment by the 
average transfer rate in Table 2. 
7. Total carbon sequestration is negative for some watersheds under the land-
retirement-only scenarios (HUCs 7030, 7040, 7070). This is because carbon seques-
tration is measured as the difference between land retirement and conventional till-
age. For some rotations (e.g., rotations with alfalfa), the carbon sequestration 
potential for retired land with grass cover is not as high as when the land remains as 
working land. 
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